Why don't we have a complete plan for reforms?
In order to play chess, one must know the rules ... how to move the various pieces on the board.
But it is not possible to know the situation on the chessboard after the 15th or 25th move.
--Vaclav Klaus, Finance Minister, Czechoslovakia
Each day, new scientists, managers, executives, and government leaders express concern about the safety and reliability of complex computer systems.
As such systems take charge of everything from phone calls to flights, we are all exposed to a growing danger of man-made disasters. John Kunz attributes partof theproblem to a design-and-testing process taken from software engineering,a process thatbegins with a formal specification of the system's behavior and ends with an acceptance test(9).This process cannot take intoaccount that the standardsforexpert performance can shiftas a fieldchanges. Kunz argues that, to obtainreliable K.BSs, continualtesting and improvement must be the standardapproach. The testsmust do more than compare KBS decisionswith realsituations; they must validatethatat alltimes the recommended actionsfulfill thepurpose of the system, that the reasoning procedures arevalid forthe domain, and thattherecommended actionsare consistently endorsed and assessedas competent by human experts.Kunz recommends thatthe testsinclude simple realistic cases as well as cases thatapply various stresses to the K.BS. He recommends thatsome of the tests be retrospective (comparing KBS decisionswith those of experts in the past)and thatsome be prospective(measuring the performance of the KBS againstthatof experts in realtime) before the system is deployed in the field.
KBS's are founded on the assumption thatan expertworks from a complete theory of the domain. Once a theoryis articulated as a setof rulesand storedin a database,the superior power of the computer can draw inferences much faster than the expert. That this has not been accomplished cannot be blamed on a lack of computing power, memory, research effort, or cooperation of experts. An explanation gaining credence is that experts themselves do not work from complete theories, and much of their expertise cannot be articulated in language. In Kline's analysis physical systems and hardware systems have three characteristics that lead to low model complexity: they operate under invariant rules, their parts are context-independent, and they are not self-observing. In contrast, human systems have changing rules and are context-dependent and self-observing. The key distinguishing factor is that major jumps in complexity arise when the "rules of the game" (the governing laws) can change or evolve unpredictably. This has important implications for models of human systems. They must be created by ongoing development rather than prior analysis.
They cannot be used reliably for prediction;
instead they must supplement and augment, but not replace, human judgment. Kline ends up questioning the "science-based" approach to modeling these systems, an approach rooted in the Newtonian (mechanistic) tradition, which assumes that all of the universe is governed by fixed laws. 
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Description, Computation, Prediction
These authors share the conclusions that models involving human behavior are unavoidably complex, that such models may not work except in limited cases, and that even then they will be made to work by ongoing development rather than by prior analysis.
They suggest that one's trust in the reliability of such models depends on one's assumptions about how biological organisms and societies learn and act. But they diverge on this claim: Models can produce greater understanding of complex human phenomena, lead us to wise decisions and guide us to effective actions.
Forrester is op_stic about this claim. Kunz implicitly accepts it in the domain of knowledge-based systems.
But Dreyfus, Wynn, and Kline express serious doubts. The divergence of views on this important question is at the heart of the question of computer modeling of human realities.
In what follows I offermy own analysisof thisclaim,and I suggest ways that computers can assist us effectively in the domain of human actions.
What isa model? We usuallyunderstand a model to be a symbolic representation of a setof objects, theirrelationships and theirallowable motions (]4). We use models in threeprincipalways:
Description. We sometimes use a model to describehow a system works. The formalityof the descriptionsharpens understanding;thedescriptioncan be shared with othersto achieve a shared understanding. Examples arca blueprint, a scale model of a railroad, theequations of motion of a planet,the scientific method, and the software-designprocess.
Computation. Wc sometimes use a model to guidc,to reproduce or to calculate actionin the domain. Examples arc following directions from an incmal guidance system (guiding), a flight simulator(reproducing)or computing a mcasurcmcnt (calculating).
Prediction_
We sometimes use a model to predict the future state of a system with tolerable certainty. Examples are models that predict the lift of a wing in flight, the We can use a map to achieve an understanding of the layout of a city and to discuss possible tours with others (description).
We can use a map to navigate through the city to a destination (computation).
Or we can use a map to estimate how long it will take to reach a destination (prediction).
And the aphorism, "The map is not the territory," reminds us not to confuse models with reality.
Reliability and Complexity
What is reliability in modeling?
A model is reliable if we find that it recurrently agrees with phenomena in the domain modeled.
A model with many parameters is unlikely to be judged reliable because it is infeasible to explore the parameter space completely during testing and because the model's calculations may be sensitive to small changes in an unknown few of the parameters. A model is also unlikely to be judged reliable if we have not found a set of variables sufficient to describe the phenomenon of interest.
The more sophisticated predictive models provide indicators of the certainty of the prediction. These measures take the form of confidence intervals associated with numerical values or probabilities associated with states. If not interpreted properly, these measures can give a false sense of security about the reliability of the model--everyone has had experiences in which we were certain of an outcome that never happened. Some modelers say that these measures allow comparisons: a model with smaller confidence intervals than another would be judged as the more powerful.
It is important to ask whether the model does significantly
better than random guesses. Even if it does, it need not be reliable because the uncertainty in its predictions may be too great. What is complexity? Complexity is an assessment we make about our capacity to accurately describe, compute or predict phenomena in a domain.
This assessment is
related to the number of variables, parameters and loops that exist in a system: for the greater those numbers, the greater our uncertainty about how the system works and the lower our capacity to describe, simulate or predict it accurately.
Note that chaotic behavior in the sense recently understood as "mathematical chaos" is not judged as complex by this standard (5) . Such behavior can be described by simple equations, and its future trajectory can be calculated by iteration. These mathematical tools and powerful computers now allow us to calculate in excellent detail phenomena that we used to call complex--examples include cloud formation, leaf structure and turbulence.
Present computers are not fast enough for prediction--for example, recent joint studies of turbulence by investiagtors at Stanford and the NASA Ames Research Center took six months of time on a Cray Y-MP supereomputer for each case. On the other hand, chaotic functions do not necessarily provide reliable models because the future states can sometimes be very sensitive to the initial condition, about which there is often great uncertainty.
It is worth noting that we can make separate assessments of complexity about a model and about the domain modeled. This is because the model is itself a system that has variables, parameters and loops. It is possible to offer a simple model for a complex domain, although we would be surprised if the model were reliable in this case. It is common to see complex models for simple domains. Our ideal is a simple model that reliably and rapidly reproduces the selected phenomena of the domain.
Meta-modeling
In an effort to understand where the complexity of models originates and how approximations arise, some modelers have modeled the modeling process itself. Agrawal's book is an example (1). If you will permit me some light mathematics, I can show you how the modeling process itself introduces complexities that are often overlooked.
One can regard the construction of a model as a series of steps, each of which wansforms a model into a simpler model by introducing a simplifying assumption. Let us focus on one of these steps. Suppose we have a model M with parameters P and one variable x. The model can be used to calculate a value of its variable by an algorithm x = M (P). Suppose now we seek a faster algorithm by introducing a simplifying assumption A that maps the values of the original parameters and variable into the new parameters P' of M': P' = A (P ,x). The new model can now be used to calculate a value for the variable: x -M'(P ') = M'(P ,x )). Notice that the calculation is of the form: x = F (x). The predicted value of the variable is now the fixed point of a nonlinear function. If the value ofx is initially unknown, an iteration must be employed to find a convergent value, and the total computation time is not simply one application of the simpler model. Some of the fixed points of the function may be stable and others unstable, meaning that the final value may depend on the initial condition. Moreover, the time to convergence becomes an issue, and there is a possibility ofchaotic behavior (in the mathematical sense) in the iteration. This situation gets worse when several variables of the original model participate in the simplifying assumptions.
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The conclusion is that "simplifying assumptions" can introduce rather than resolve computational complexities, a possibility that looms larger for systems with many variables and for models with many simplifications.
This means that an assessment of reliability may be extremely difficult to make for models that contain many simplifying assumptions. And, as Wynn points out, it is easy for us to ignore these complexities by pursuading ourselves that the model is real or that the simplifying assumptions are of no consequence.
Meta-assessments
In addition to assessments of reliability and complexity, we often make a third kind of assessment--a recta-assessment--about whether a model's complexity or degree of reliability is "good" or "bad." I bring this up because in many discussions about modeling complex systems, I hear a background of frustration that the systems to be modeled, and thus the models themselves, are complex.
It is "bad" that things are complex and a challenge to our ingenuity to find a reliable and computable model anyway.
If we have such a meta-assessment, it will be extremely difficult to conclude that some systems are not worth an attempt at modeling.
For example, many people accept that a major responsibility of government is to "plan" the economy, and thus it is necessary to have reliable models that will allow prediction of future states of the economy resulting from various policies, so that we can determine now which policies to enact. We seek a scientific approach to governance. In this context the absence of a reliable model of the world economy is "bad" and is sufficient to motivate the expenditure of millions of dollars in pursuit of computer models of the world's economy.
We do not always judge that complexity is "bad." We live in an unimaginably complex world of five billion people, each engaged in a network of conversations with others. Declarations made in distant parts of this network can affect the possibilities open to us even though we are not part of the conversation leading to the decision. (The  Iraqi takeover of Kuwait is a good recent example.) Most of us simply accept that the world network of human conversations is highly complex and unpredictable, that the roles of the game may be altered without warning at any time, and that the roles will surely evolve. Our strategy in this case is not to find models whose predictions can guide our actions; it is rather to create organizations and use their power to effect action. Successful organizations do not rely on computer models; they develop strategies to position themselves in the world marketplace. Entrepreneurs such as Tom Peters thrive in this environment of complexity and uncertainty--they assess complexity as "good"
.
Another category of meta-assessments are those people make of the future as they carry out their work in organizations and social systems. We call these assessments "moods."
Not only do individuals have moods, so do organizations and social units. 
Productive
Uses of Computers
Several conclusions emerge from the discussion above:
• As part of our modeling efforts we must come to understand the domains over which a given model is reliable, partly reliable and unreliable. We must also understand the situations in which models can be useful as a way of grounding speculations about the future dynamics of systems.
• Systems whose rules can evolve or change in unpredictable ways are unlikely to have a reliable predictive or speculative model.
• We must be careful with the output of models, being constantly skeptical that those outputs are "facts" or are accurate descriptions of the world.
• In our technological age, it is easy to accept the claim that every phenomenon can ultimately be modeled, given sufficient knowledge and computational resources. There is reason to doubt this faith.
• If our mood makes us disinclined to acceptance complexity, it is easy to substitute the model for reality and to confuse our opinions with "scientific facts" supported by the model. We can use computers to help manage and track the flow of work and information.
We can confine models to domains in which their predictive power can be used reliably, namely domains in which the rules are known in advance. In all cases, however, we must let the computer support the decision-maker, and not let the computer make the decisions.
